Subsidies to US Auto Industry

Over the last decade, the world has been facing economic crises. One major crisis was witnessed in 2008. In necessitated legislation of an act that would enable the government to help struggling industries survives the occasional economic depressions.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Subsidies to US Auto Industry specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More In the same year, the congress passed into law a bill popularly known as the troubled asset relief programmed (Brunetti 11). This bill did not address a situation in any particular industry. However, it was made with the consideration of the difficulties that some important industries in the US economy were facing at the time. Thus, the government did not immediately move on to assist any industry that was facing problems at the time (Brunetti 13). Automobile manufacturers in the United States of America have always been a critical part of the economy. Collapse of companie s in the automobile manufacturing industry could have dire consequences for the US economy. The sector also employed more than a million people. Furthermore, the number of people employed in the automobile manufacturing sector remained significant despite the decline over the last few years Late in 2008, two automotive manufactures, Chrysler Corporation and General Motors appealed to the congress to approve assistance from the government to help them avoid certain liquidation in the face of financial insolvency (Brunetti 20). While presenting the case, the companies did not argue that they were doing well in the market, but they rather tried to illustrate their efforts towards avoiding financial crises.Advertising Looking for essay on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Their argument was that the economy would face severe ramifications if one of the major automobile manufacturers were to undergo liquidation. No details of the projected plan were given, but the manufacturers cited substantial financial gains in general. After debate within the congress, senate, and state administration, the government decided to assist the automobile industry to avoid the impending liquidation for several companies (United States Congress, United States Congress 25). The World Trade Organization has anti subsidy rules that were formulated to ensure that there is a competitive international trade. In addition, the rules were established with the view of increasing free trade in the international arena. WTO ensured that its regulations did not cripple individual governments that wished to take corrective measures to salvage an economy that is on the verge of collapse. Thus, anti-subsidy laws are mild, and are meant to deter governments from subsidizing export and import commodities to the extent where the effect of the subsidies affects other countries and companies in the same trade. Otherwise, small subs idies for justifiable reasons are allowed. In addition, to regulate subsidization of products by the government, the WTO has formulated barriers in form of increased tariffs for subsidized products. These barriers are meant to be regulatory measures rather than settle scores among disputing countries. The problem is that the companies could not redeem themselves after the government gave the grants. They eventually had to be liquidated, and more money was used to establish new entities, with a significant amount of capital being contributed by the United States government.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Subsidies to US Auto Industry specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More It is obvious that the government had acted to save millions of jobs that were at stake. However, through this action, the government was actually subsidizing the American automobile industry beyond what some financial analysts consider acceptable li mits. The situation at Chrysler and General Motors had been partially due to stiff competition. A bailout as substantial as that implemented by the US government seemed like interference with free trade. Most importantly, this action appeared to be a violation of the World Trade Organization’s guidelines on international trade. Other countries could consider bailing out their automobile manufacturing industries to even the scores. Alternating counteractive actions would then lead to hostile tax policies between trading partners, disrupting international trade. Thus, the United States domestic trade policies may be indirect sabotage of international trade (Webel 12). One of the conditions within the subsidies and countervailing measures as outlined by the WTO is that direct transfer of funds must be evident for the bailout to be considered a valid subsidy. In addition, the said subsidy must the directed towards a specific sector of the economy or industry. In that case, the US government’s action qualifies to be classified a subsidy. Furthermore, the US government issued funds directly to a few organizations. WTO requires signatories to its guidelines to avoid directly subsidizing those industries that manufacture goods purposely for export or import trade (Webel 18). That way, the international trade is protected from machinations of any single country. Other regulations within section II of the trade agreements ratified in Uruguay urge countries to desist from subsidizing major industries such that there is a significant effect on trade partners.Advertising Looking for essay on business economics? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More WTO rules also specify that for a bailout to be considered a subsidy, the law of the particular country must isolate the entities being subsidized as the only industries eligible for the particular subsidy. Moreover, WTO considers any benefit of an industry acquired through foregoing of debts owed to the government amounts to a valid subsidy. Since the program was directed by congress in the United States, it qualifies as a valid subsidy to companies that deal in merchandise meant for export. The actions of the United States government contravene almost all guidelines of WTO Uruguay convention regulations (Webel 21). Any member of WTO or automobile manufacturer, which wishes to file a complaint with WTO, may prove several facts to validate its claim. One of the conditions is that the complaining entity may prove that the defendant nation caused a significant setback to the complaining entity’s domestic operations or progress. Secondly, the complaining entity may prove that th e defendant nation hindered the benefit of the complainant by subsidizing a certain industry beyond the acceptable maximum level. Finally, the complaining entity may prove that the defendant nation had prejudice in its action to subsidize a competing rival of the complainant. Several setbacks would face any country or automobile manufacturer that would wish to challenge the United States Bailout program to the WTO as a violation of WTO agreements. For WTO to accept the complaints by any country or automotive manufacturer there must be enough proof to validate the claim (Webel 24). One of the requirements is that the complainant in the case must proof that the United States government subsidized goods meant for export directly. Furthermore, there should be proof that the United States government benefited the companies that were subject to assistance. It is difficult to determine whether there was any benefit for the American automotive manufacturers. The complex procedures and disso lution of the two companies is difficult to analyze, particularly because the old business entities were eventually dissolved and new ones formed. If countermeasures were to be applied by the WTO, the implications of the past subsidies would remain, and the said measures would act just as a deterrent to any future violation of international trade laws. This means that the complainant would not be compensated for any damage caused by the subsidies. For this reason, the complainant may not be motivated to file any complaint against a subsidization that has already occurred. The lack of any financial award by WTO arbitration is a major setback to the international law (Webel 26). As of now, the subsidization of the two American automakers by the government of the United States remains a perceived action rather than a proven fact. Although is it is difficult to proof guilt or take action against the united states of America for the perceived misconduct, there are implications arising fr om reaction of the international market, foreign automotive manufacturers, and other countries that are preparing themselves to take similar action, should multinational companies operating in the country require government assistance. When subsidies are given to an industry with a significant share of international market, a degenerative effect is likely to occur. Competitiveness of companies within the international market becomes impaired by such actions. Apart from the automotive manufacturing industry, other sectors are likely to suffer from changes in trade tariff. Many of the countries involved in substantial trade with the United States may raise tariff so imports from the United States in response to the unfair subsidization of the United States motor industry. However, action by aggrieved parties may also be hampered by the economic power of the corporations that were subsidized. General Motors Corporation and Chrysler are comparatively smaller than the largest automobile manufacturers in the world (Webel 29. However, they operate on a multinational scale and employ citizens of their host countries. Closure of the two companies may make the companies lay off their workers in some of the countries. Thus, any country with interest in either General Motors or Chrysler is not likely to file any complaint against the automobile makes since such an action goes against their interest. Following the support of Chrysler and General Motors by the American government, some of Europe’s automobile manufacturers have been taking similar action though on a smaller scale. It is the difficult for WTO to impose any barrier to such action since no action has been taken against the US government decision to bailout domestic automobile manufacturers. Germany gave one and half billion Euros to Opel, a General Motors corporation subsidiary. On the other hand, France tried to influence Renault by giving the company a loan of about eight billion Euros. Britain also ga ve a loan of three million dollars to domestic automobile manufacturers (Lincicome 9). All these moves by European countries were reactions to the subsidizing of general motors and Chrysler by American government. In turn, the companies that received the said favors, continued to take actions that would indirectly benefit the countries that offered loans and bailouts. Such actions may cause mistrust and therefore fragmentation of global automobile trade. The practice may also spread to other industries, and eventually cause a global depression. It can be argued that the actions of countries that have significant manufacturing industry are a response to the actions of the United States. On the other hand, such actions may be considered efforts by the governments to salvage one of their most important industries from collapse. However, all these subsidies given to the automobile manufacturing industry around the world are a violation of WTO rules in one way or another (Lincicome 14). On careful analysis of the procedures and circumstances, one may choose to consider the actions as a part of a commercial war among the countries that host competing manufacturing industries. Although grants were given to several automotive manufacturing industries around the world, it is important to consider the circumstances of the period within which relief was offered to the manufacturers. The year 2008 had an economic depression that threatened to bog down many industries apart from the automotive manufacturing sector. In the case of United States, it is reasonable to take into account for the size of the automobile industry and its role in the economy. The jobs that Chrysler Corporation and General Motors offered to the public were too many for the government to risk losing. Such a big loss of jobs would have serious political and financial implications for the country. Thus, logic dictates that any government in a similar position would have gone to such a length to rescue t he automotive manufacturing industry. It is also possible that if the United States had sought permission or exemption from WTO or other countries with significant automotive manufacturing sector, it would have taken too long for the bailout programs to be useful to the situation in the industry (Technological innovation and public policy: the automotive industry 45). Similarly, it would have taken too long for United States government to present an amendment proposal to the WTO for consideration to favor its remedy for the automotive industry. Thus, to many observers, the United States did what was in the best interest of the citizens. Furthermore, the United States has other subsidy program for automotive makers other than the plan to bail out Chrysler and General Motors (Chong 45). For example, the United States government has endeavored to provide financial assistance to companies that sell automotive parts to Chrysler and General motors’ in order to maintain smooth trade for the organizations. In turn, manufacturing process at General motors and Chrysler is smooth. Through this mechanism, losses are avoided. However, some of the organizations that benefit from this plan are foreign companies in which the United States government has little direct interest. One can then conclude that the United States bails out companies within the country, but also provides similar assistance to companies outside the country (Chong 53). In such a situation, there is no substantial reason to allege that the United States government had prejudice against some foreign manufacturers. However much the United States government was justified in implementing its contingency plan in the case of automobile manufacturers, there is need to follow trade rules to ensure that there is cooperation in international trade (Lincicome 15). It is important for the country, which is the leading economic power, to show faith in rules and regulations that it has previously championed. The Uruguay concessions were formulated under the patronage of the United States and other leading economic powers. Consequently, it becomes hypocritical for the champion of the said laws to be the first to breach them. Although one cannot conclude that the subsidization of automotive industry in Europe was a reaction to the American case, it could still be a possibility. Thus, whether the government of the United States had a credible reason to bailout its automotive manufacturing industry or not, the fact remains that the US government breached international trade laws. Works Cited Brunetti, Paul. â€Å"United States Economic Policy: US subsidies in the context of World Trade Organisation.† United States Economic Policy 33.5 (2011): 7-24. Print. Chong, Michael D.. Study of the crisis in the automotive sector in Canada report of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology. Ottawa, Ont.: Canada Parliament House of Commons, 2009. Print. Lincicome, Scot. â€Å"Coun tervailing Calamity How to Stop the Global Subsidies Race.†Policy Analysis 11.7 (2012): 1-36. Print. Technological innovation and public policy: the automotive industry. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print. United States Congress, United States Congress. Congressional Oversight Panel September oversight report: the use of TARP funds in the support and reorganization of the domestic automotive industry.. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. :, 2009. Print. Webel, Baird. â€Å"Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Implementation and Status.† Congressional Research Service36.5 (2012): 4-33. Print. This essay on Subsidies to US Auto Industry was written and submitted by user Taraji Whitfield to help you with your own studies. You are free to use it for research and reference purposes in order to write your own paper; however, you must cite it accordingly. You can donate your paper here.

Persuasive Essay

Persuasive Essay The primary purpose of persuasive essay is to persuade or convince the reader that a certain claim or viewpoint is right. A persuasive essay can be written from either a subjective or an objective point of view simply because persuasion is found in a variety of settings: from informal communities to large formal groups. What Is a Persuasive Essay A persuasive essay is one of the common types of essays. As its name suggests, the primary purpose of this essay is to persuade or convince the reader that a certain claim or viewpoint is right. A persuasive essay can be written from either a subjective or an objective point of view simply because persuasion is found in a variety of settings: from informal communities to large formal groups. Therefore an assumption can be made that persuasive essays are given to students of all educational levels to hone their persuasive and argumentation skills. Obviously, persuasive essays train written skills, allowing students to read around, search for proper arguments or think carefully what points should be brought up by in a persuasive essay. HOW TO WRITE A PERSUASIVE ESSAY The next step in persuading your audience is oral persuasion, which refers to oratory skills. The latter are harder to master but are an essential skill to acquire. Therefore, a persuasive essay can be viewed as an assignment that is given to students during their later high school or early college/university years to help them better master the art of conviction. Persuasive Essays vs. Argumentative Essays These two essay types resemble each other like two identical twins. However, there is a slight difference that allows you to tell those twins from one another. That difference stems from the purpose of each essay, so lets review them briefly. The main goal of the persuasive essay is to persuade the audience, while the primary purpose of argumentative essays is to bring up the argument, voice the pros and cons, the strengths and weaknesses and generally to describe things or events in their duality. As an illustration, compare the way a persuasive essay topic sounds to how the argumentative essay topic is put: Persuasive Essay Topic: Smoking  should be banned. Argumentative Essay Topic: Should smoking be banned? TOP 101 PERSUASIVE ESSAY TOPICS As seen from the example above, in the persuasive essay the topic is introduced in the form of a declarative sentence. It implies the reader that the statement is true and text in the body of the essay will support the topic. The argumentative essay topic is actually a question, which prompts the discussion. The question invites the author and the reader to look for all possible choices and all possible arguments. Respectively, contents of each paper will differ depending on its topic. Persuasive Essay  Outline Unless specified otherwise, persuasive essays will take the 5 paragraph format. This means that the persuasive essay will contain the following structural elements: the introduction with the topic sentence, two to three body paragraphs, and a conclusion. The introduction will present the problem to the reader and will simultaneously serve as an attention getter. Body paragraphs will elaborate in greater detail on the information presented in the introduction. The language in your persuasive essay can be either formal or informal that depends entirely on your audience. We have a great article that explains essay structure in the greater detail. The language in your persuasive essay can be either formal or informal that depends entirely on your audience. If you are trying to convince a friend or a relative, the informal language would make sense; however, if you are writing for a formal group (teacher, unknown people), then it would be best to use the formal style. Transition Words for Persuasive Essay Agreement and Comparison: also, and, likewise, in addition; Opposition and Contradiction: rather, but, and or; Cause and Purpose: in that case, as a result, under those circumstances; Effect and Outcome: accordingly, thus, consequently, then; Result: as shown above, as can be seen, in the final analysis, all things considered. If you are looking for persuasive essay examples, here is a great one below: FREE PERSUASIVE ESSAY EXAMPLE Persuasive Essays by has completed persuasive essays on various topics. The experience we have accumulated in the process allows us to work on a virtually endless number of topics within all complexity levels. If you want a top notch persuasive essay, youve come to the right place. Simply email us your requirements, place an order and we will provide you with an excellent persuasive essay written up to the standard. Our writers always stay in touch with customers to make sure their needs are fully met.

English legal system case report Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

English legal system case report - Essay Example ited type of knife has been described by this section as one that has an automatically opening blade (Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (c.37), 1959). However, in this knife, the blade should open when hand pressure is applied to a button or other device attached to the knife handle. Such offence attracts the following punishment, on summary conviction. For a first offence the offender will be sentenced to prison for a term that does not exceed three months or to a fine that is limited to  £50 or to both (Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (c.37), 1959). In this case, the chief inspector charged the respondent with an offence under the provisions of section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The charge was that on 26 October1959, the respondent had made an offer of sale with respect to a prohibited variety of knife. This knife opened automatically on pressure being applied to a device that was attached to the handle of the knife (Souper, 2008). The respondent consented to the police constable’s request to examine the knife. Thereafter, the latter confiscated the knife and submitted it to the superintendent of police. Subsequently, he returned to the shop and informed the respondent that the knife had been determined to be a flick knife and that he would be reported for offering it for sale (Souper, 2008). In court the appellant contended that the display of the knife in the shop window by the respondent with its price, constituted an offer of sale of the knife, in accordance with the provisions of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. This was contested by the respondent, who stated that he had never offered the knife for sale, as per the interpretation of the 1959 Act (Souper, 2008). The plaintiff’s main contention was that the display of Knife in the shop window does not amount to an offer. The court held that as this Act was devoid of a definition, the term offer for sale had to be determined from the law of contract. As a

Sales Organizational Plan Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Sales Organizational Plan - Essay Example Sales Organizational Plan Bracrekunmitso Pharmaceuticals can use the Internet and local press for advertising purposes. Also, it is possible to use employment agencies to find professional staff in a short period of time. Selection practices will be based on manual resume screening and computerized. This procedure will help to select high professional applicants for the first interview. If the recruitment is competitive, it can create a feeling that those who are selected are truly valued. It can help build a positive self-image if the on-the-job experiences confirm that feeling. For Bracrekunmitso Pharmaceuticals, to recruit high qualified professionals is crucial especially for direct sales and customer support services. Medical degree and experience within pharmaceutical industry will be the main requirement applied to all candidates. The main criteria for selection will be professional skills and practical knowledge, personal characteristics and experience. Interviews will consist of several parts: behavi or based analysis, training and experience evaluations, biographical information and motivational fit (Armstrong 2001). Bracrekunmitso Pharmaceuticals will need expensive training programs for new staff. A special programs will be designed for pharmaceutical representatives and physicians referrals. One approach, which is somewhat broader than an assess ¬ment of training needs, and may be biased to the strategic changes the company is facing, is to design a workshop for senior managers to work through what is needed to implement some of the strategic decisions the company has made. Armstrong (2001) divides training needs assessment into three levels: corporate, group and individual level. The aim of the training is to help employee to cope with new environment and develop effective communication skills. Customer orientation means application of quality control principles to design/specification activities to formalize the mechanism for ensuring that customer requirements are incorporated. One of the most basic dilemmas faced by trainers is the balance between theory and practice; between what may be considered as theoretically desirable and what participants perceive as practically possible to implement. It is also important to achieve an appropriate balance between the assimilation of knowledge information and the development of skills in order to do something. Employees, for their part, should receive positive recognition for good training achievements. Also, special programs could be designed for team leaders to ensure effective group work and communication. Training will help to inspire and motivate employees. (Campbell, 1997). Bracrekunmitso Pharmaceuticals can use learning curve. Following Schuler (1998) it ascends quickly, showing increasing proficiency. There are various levels in the curve, where an employee is consolidating and developing the knowledge. Where a group of persons is trained, the group may set 'norms' which may stop individuals from moving ahead, and therefore it is important to ensure that the group norms are the same as the objectives of the trainer, so that individuals can progress (Schuler, 1998). Policies and Procedures The staff can exercise self-direction and control to achieve objectives to which they are committed, if they are persuaded by the

Diet Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Diet - Essay Example Humans are omnivorous in nature, but both psychological and social factors have a significant influence on the dietary habits of individuals or a community, some of which may be useful and others harmful. For the purpose of this paper, ethnic/cultural and educational factors will be examined under the social angle, while memory and attitude factors will be discussed under the psychological aspect. Such factors strongly influence the deliberate choice of food intake. Indeed, diet has its detrimental effects on health when not undertaken properly and as per guidance from professionals. Individuals wishing to undergo a diet will be restricting themselves in what they drink and eat aiming at losing weight or becoming healthier (Conner & Norman 2005). Although healthy dieting averts complications like diabetes, the partakers may also fall victim to various negative outcomes like the weakening of the immune system. Such negative results deter the body’s ability to manage the changes dieting causes and how well it adapts to new behaviors. The understanding of the variables encountered in the body enables dieting people to decide their failure or success. For example, calories are essential in providing energy and supporting bodily functions. However, if consumed excessively during a diet, they not only increase the body’s fat content, but body weight as well. A deficit leads to lack of energy and constant fatigue. Carbohydrates are also a source of energy, but failure to distinguish between healthy sources is detrimental. Rather than getting the supply from sugary foods like sweets and soft drinks, they should be obtained in a more readily available form like corn, rice and cereals. Over indulging and under indulging in certain nutrients leads to either dangerous and unhealthy weight gain or loss. Life threatening conditions then set in, such as binge eating, bulimia and anorexia. In anorexia, a dieter is tormented by the fear of getting overweight, and in bulimia, a dieter usually ends up in recurring cycles of purging and binge eating. The dieter abuses diuretics and laxatives in a bid to acquire desired looks. Below is an examination of social and psychological factors and their influence on health. Cultural/ethnic Factors Growing up in distinctive traditions, cultural values and beliefs determines diet choices and how food is prepared among diverse communities in diverse sections of the world, with each ethnic group having their own culturally based food habits (Shepherd 1999). Therefore, different cultures, which are further embedded in ethnicity and religion, produce varied health risks in different people. As an example, African Americans are prone to diabetes and heart diseases mainly due to their cuisine. On the other hand, although they cannot be completely written off, such diseases are less prevalent among the East Asian cultures as their cuisine is mainly composed of vegetables, seafood and low-fat foods (Rubin 2004). This is because some diets are already a part of some nations’ culture. Migrating populations may, however, be an exception, as seen among South Asian women who moved to Scotland and recorded an increased intake of fats that was associated with a higher body mass index and more incidences of heart disease. In the same fashion, food is a key aspect of the Mexican

The Eurozone Crisis and EU Fiscal Governance Reform

The Eurozone Crisis and EU Fiscal Governance Reform   Framing the Eurozone Crisis: A Case of Limited Ambition Abstract The eurozone crisis provided a new opportunity for obtaining supranational fiscal integration within the European single currency area. This study applies a framing analysis to the crisis discourse that emerged from within the European Union’s (EU) intergovernmental forums involved in fiscal policy coordination. As well as linking policy frames to two different integration scenarios for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the broader influence of macroeconomic ideology is also emphasised. It is found that the response to the intensification of the crisis in Europe was to employ framing devices supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. While there were emergent supranational discourses over the longer term, these were reflective of a limited reform ambition. A key constraining factor here were the sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard circulating amongst member states, which together have ensured that a supranational fiscal policy is unlikely to be obtained i n Europe.   Introduction This article considers the response from within the intergovernmental forums to the eurozone crisis and the future prospects for fiscal supranationalism in Europe more broadly. When political scientists have turned their attention to the politics of the crisis, it has often figured as a case study to support the grand theoretical claims made by the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). This approach has tried to theorize a new paradox in European integration in the post-Maastricht era: ‘Member States pursue more integration but stubbornly resist further supranationalism’ (Puetter 2012, 168). Certain institutional dynamics associated with the new intergovernmentalism can be found to be at work within EMU where, particularly since the onset of the crisis, there have been marked increases in intergovernmental policy coordination within the European Council and ECOFIN Council structures (Hodson 2011; Puetter 2012). However, the approach is still at an early stage of development and deep empirical analysis of the political deliberations and policy environment within these settings are still lacking. Further criticisms have been made. In particular, Schimmelfennig (2015, 724) points out that, ‘They do not distinguish intergovernmentalism and supranationalism by the integration outcomes (either substantive or in terms of the level or scope of integration)’. Thus, claims of an ‘integration paradox’ taking place within EMU specifically or across the wider EU remain uncertain. This article focuses on the issue of EU fiscal governance reform following the intensification of eurozone crisis. The potential role of ideas as engines of policy change within EMU is a prospect taken seriously here (Dyson 2000). With this in mind, the  discursive institutionalist  theoretical framework proposed by Schmidt is employed (Schmidt 2008, 2010). This approach is well suited to considering the role of ideas and discourse interactions in bringing about change in an EU institutional context (see Schmidt 2015). It is applied through a framing analysis of the reform discussions that emerged from within the key intergovernmental forums involved in guiding the crisis response (Goffman 1974). This article identifies the dominant policy frames (‘problems’ and ‘solutions’) organising the reform debate, and links them to two alternative reform paths for EU fiscal governance: intergovernmental and supranational. In doing so, this article clarifies far more precisely the different political and economic policy options for reforming EMU governance, as well as previously underdetermined concepts such as ‘fiscal union’ and ‘political union’. As well as linking individual policy frames to different integration scenarios, the important role of macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences is also emphasised. Theoretical and Methodological Framework It could be assumed that the eurozone crisis would confirm neofunctionalist  beliefs concerning the dynamics of the European integration  process: the weaknesses revealed in the asymmetric single currency area create strong pressures for a functional ‘spillover’ of supranational competencies to the European level (Rosamond 2005). However, when political scientists have turned their attention to the crisis, it has often been directed at the intensified intergovernmental policy coordination that has taken place within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (Hodson 2011; Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). While broader new intergovernmentalist claims of an ‘integration paradox’ in Europe involving integration without supranationalism remain undetermined (see Schimmelfennig 2015), these findings do suggest that deep supranational integration may not be obtained in EMU. Moreover, it has previously been found that a supranational reform agenda was not internalised by the Commission[1]. Together these findings are important as the long-term sustainability of the single currency area without significant steps being taken towards a more deeply integrated fiscal union has been questioned (De Grauwe 2013). Through a framing analysis this article will seek to explore if the crisis response from within the intergovernmental institutions was to push for supranationalism within EU fiscal governance, or alternatively, a retaining of intergovernmental control at the EU level. And, if the later course prevails, it will seek to offer a more complete theoretical explanation of why member states continue to resist supranationalism, even in the face of significant centralisation pressures. A deeper understanding of the political determinants of the EMU policy environment will also help facilitate a more complete explanation of why a supranational reform agenda was found not to have been internalised within DG ECFIN. The overarching theoretical framework informing this analysis is discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008; 2010). Of particular relevance here is the distinction made by discursive institutionalism between ‘coordinative discourse’—which takes place internally within the EU policy making setting—and ‘communicative discourse’—which take place externally between EU policy actors and the general public (Schmidt 2005). This study integrates discursive institutionalism alongside a frame analysis. Framing has been criticised for its lack of consistency in application of theory and method, with many different variants being operationalised without adequate clarification (Cacciatore et al. 2016). Framing has also been found to share common processes with agenda-setting and priming, although framing offers a more ‘encompassing conceptual approach’ (Aday 2006, 768). Here, a sociological approach to framing is adopted, which can be traced back to the work of Goffman (1974). A frame is understood as a ‘schemata of interpretation’, which can shape actors’ perceptions of reality and, in turn, influence political behaviour (Goffman 1974, 21). Inspired by Goffman’s approach, Benford and Snow (2000) make an important distinction between ‘prognostic’ and ‘diagnostic’ framing: the construction of particular  problem representations and possible solutions. This is valuable for facilitating a deeper understanding of the diagnosis of the causes of the eurozone crisis arrived at, as well as an exploration of the interlinking reforms suggested to solve or at least deal with the problems posed by the eurozone crisis.   Ideas within frames can be understood as occurring at different levels of generalisation: specific policy ideas related to problem and solutions (e.g. strengthened rules-based surveillance versus debt mutualisation); normative ideas which attach value to political action (e.g. fiscal discipline versus fiscal solidarity); and finally these can be connected to programmatic ideas related to broader policy paradigms and ideologies (Schmidt 2005; 2008). As a means to locate the key framing ideas that are likely to figure in the institutional discourse on the eurozone crisis, a wider review of the reform literature on EU fiscal governance will be completed (see the section below, ‘Literature Review’). Table (1) helps to link the different problem and solution policy frames that will be uncovered as part of this discussion to two different integration scenarios for EMU: intergovernmental and supranational. As well as showing how ideas relate to different policy measures (proble ms and solutions) and normative arguments, the wider role of macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences for EMU reform is also highlighted here. Following a framing analysis, the dominant frames uncovered will also be explored in relation to the wider interplay between ideas and institutions within EMU[2].   Two guiding macroeconomic ideologies are important for understanding developments in European monetary integration: neoliberalism and Keynesianism. Neoliberalism is a highly contested term, although from an ideological standpoint it favours market based solutions and methods over  government  intervention (Holden 2011). In contrast, perhaps the most important insight of Keynesianism is the recognition of the need for  demand management by the state both in economic downturns and  booms (Skidelsky 1992, 572-624). Keynesian theory, therefore, demands a far more active role for the state in managing the economy through fiscal policy. Neoliberal ideas have been found to have become deeply embedded within the EMU policy framework, including the prevalence of ‘sound money’ and ‘sound finance’ ideas imparting fiscal discipline (Dyson 2002). There is no prior reason why neoliberalism should be associated with intergovernmentalism and Keynesianism with supranationalism. However, when applied to events taking place during the eurozone crisis, a Keynesianism philosophy demands a level of centralised fiscal solidarity amongst member states, which would imply edging towards a more supranational model of fiscal integration. On the contrary, building on, rather than replacing, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) arrangements for fiscal discipline would preserve the intergovernmental logic of EMU governance, and is more aligned with neoliberal preferences. The focus here is on the framing activities that took place within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the informal ‘eurogroup’), althoughthese frames will also be located in the context of the wider crisis discussions taking place within the EU Commission and ECB settings. The analysis distinguishes between two distinct phases of the eurozone crisis: a crisis ‘escalation’ and crisis ‘normalisation’ phase. The crisis escalation phase can be traced back to the intensification of the global financial crisis in the summer of 2007. With attention focused on the frailties of the American financial system, the eurozone economy at first assumed a ‘safe-haven’ status for many commentators (Wyplosz 2009)—although there was some prescient warnings as to the multiple risks the downturn could pose to the institutions of the European single currency area (Feldstein 2008). In early 2010, following significant upwards revisions in the budget deficit figures for Greece,   there was a sudden erosion in market confidence in the Eurozone leading tolong-term government bond yield spreads increasing dramatically for the periphery member states (Checherita et al. 2010). With the risk of sovereign default  and uncontrollable  contagion  effects at its most serious, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, swiftly put together a case for the supremacy of a European Council led Task Force in guiding a ‘fast-track’ process for EMU reform.    By the fall of 2012, market reactions towards the eurozone had normalised significantly. Key here was the ECB fulfilling its function as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2016, 126-141), which was aided by Mario Draghi’s  statement at the end of July 2012 that ‘[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to  do whatever it takes  to preserve the euro’. In response to the calming in market conditions, the attention of European leaders switched to the measures required to stabilise EMU over the longer term. Laying the foundations for these reform discussions were two strategic documents: the December 2012 report, prepared at the request of the European Council by President Van Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission, the ECB, and the Eurogroup, entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and the Commission’s own A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Launching a European Debate, published in November 2012. Building on the previous documents, in June 2015, the President of the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidents of the Council, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, presented the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ entitled Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Official documents and speeches throughout these deliberation phases will be supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews that were conducted with senior EU officials located within the European Council, ECOFIN Council and DG ECFIN during the most important phases of the crisis. It is important to differentiate between the full internalisation of discourse within institutions and discourse that is deployed in rhetoric as a strategic political device (Hay 2006). Interview data is then useful for forming a comparison between communicative discourses to the general public and the internal coordinative discourses of policy construction taking place among policy actors (Schmidt 2008). Literature Review The escalation of the Eurozone crisis in 2010 fixed attention on the design failures of the eurozone and the practicalities of having a monetary union without the accompanying integration of the fiscal side (De Grauwe 2013). Since 2010, most of the reform proposals suggested to complete the architecture of EMU have centred on the prospect of implementing two neo-Keynesian fiscal solidarity mechanisms: 1) centralised fiscal capacity (or federal budget) for stabilisation purposes; 2) and the introduction of debt mutualisation schemes. A Policy Contribution for Bruegel details the four main options for developing a fiscal capacity for the eurozone with stabilisation functions: 1) unemployment insurance; 2) payments related to deviations of output from potential; 3) the narrowing of large spreads; 4) and discretionary spending (Wolf 2012). Suggestions for debt mutualisation include the so called European Safe Bonds (Euro-nomics group 2011) and Redemption bonds (Bofinger et al. 2011). In view of the salient features of fiscal policy, it is understood as imperative that progress towards a more supranational fiscal union is accompanied by deeper political integration to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of EMU governance (Schmidt, 2015). Despite calls being made for EMU to be completed through a process of supranational fiscal integration, there is an altogether different integration route that would maintain the intergovernmental logic of fiscal arrangements in Europe. Neoliberal monetarist principles are pervasive here, with discussions of fiscal solidarity being disregarded in favour of a limited fiscal discipline agenda (von Hagen et al. 2009; 2011). The main concern under this integration scenario is with heightened budgetary surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, which could be secured under the preventative and corrective arms of the pre-existing SGP framework. The fundamentally decentralised character of EU fiscal governance would also be preserved. In the literature, support for such a limited reform agenda is often supported by a belief that the eurozone crisis was primarily the result of excessive  fiscal profligacy  in the periphery member states (Sinn 2010). Of course, the distinct lack of political integration envisioned here would mean that channels of democratic legitimacy would remain largely indirect via member state governments. Through this discussion of the literature, two reform scenarios for EMU have been identified: intergovernmental and supranational. These two models can be understood as being supported by a selection of different policy  frames,  implying different definitions of what the  problem is and different ideas of what the suitable policy solutions  may be (see Table 1). First, the intergovernmental reform scenario is guided by a simplistic fiscal profligacy diagnosis of the eurozone crisis. Such an interpretation of the crisis strongly implies neoliberal policy solutions in the form of strengthened rules-based fiscal discipline. Framing the crisis in these more limited terms may also be both politically and intellectually attractive. This is because these frames do not demand challenging integration steps being taken towards a deeper level of fiscal and political union. Alternatively, the more far reaching supranational reform scenario is informed by a broader interpretation of the crisis problem as a problem of regional imbalances. In turn, possible solutions are understood as going far beyond neoliberal fiscal discipline in the direction of the implementation of neo-Keynesian solidarity measures, including debt mutualisation and an enlarged EU budget. The need to ensure the democratic legitimacy for decisions taken at the Union level is also problematized under this integration scenario, leading to demands for the simultaneous development of a flanking political union. Table 1: Framing the Eurozone Crisis Building on [name deleted for peer review] Framing the Eurozone Crisis   Crisis Escalation Phase Following the intensification of the global financial crisis in July 2007, the eurozone was at first considered by some to be a ‘safe haven’ (Wyplosz 2009). With the full implications of the deepening global financial crisis for the eurozone not yet apparent, the crisis problem was initially framed by European leaders as one created externally by the financial excesses built-up within the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ economies. As one DG ECFIN official observed, ‘Governments believed the crisis to have originated primarily in poor regulatory practices in New York and Londonand Europe was being pulled into the crisis through the global financial system’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). A similar sentiment was also reflected in more communicative discourse as European leaders attempted to externalise the crisis. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was uncompromising in asserting before the German Bundestag that ‘excessively cheap money in the US was a driver of today’s crises’ (Financial Times 2008). Moreover, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, proclaimed in similar terms that ‘the crisis was a product of the Anglo-Saxon model’ (Financial Times 2009). Despite European leaders framing the 2008 financial collapse as an almost exclusively ‘Anglo-Saxon’ phenomenon with epicentres in New York and London, European leaders, led by Nicolas Sarkozy as the then acting president of the Council, did push for a strong coordinated European response alongside the G20 and American economies (Hodson 2011). In this early period, the framing of solutions to the crisis in Europe, overlapping with the international response and IMF recommendations, was guided heavily by Keynesian principles as leaders sought to avert financial contagion and recessionary spillovers into the real economy through coordinated fiscal expansion. In Europe, this translated into an attempt to combine both national and EU resources to ‘support demand’ and ‘cushion economies from the worst effects of the financial meltdown’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 1 2013). In November 2008, after an extraordinary summit of the euro area Heads of Government led by Nicolas  Sarkozy, the Commission proposed a Keynesian ‘European Economic Recovery plan’ (ECRP), which championed a substantial coordinated fiscal stimulus: ‘The Commission is proposing that, as a matter of urgency, Member States and the EU agree to an immediate budgetary impulse amounting to â‚ ¬ 200 billion (1.5% of GDP)’(Commission 2008). Importantly though, a key principal underpinning the plan was that any budgetary stimulus should be ‘timely, targeted, and temporary’—and that ‘Member States should commit to reverse the budgetary deterioration and return to the aims set out in the [SGP’s] medium term objectives’ (Commission 2008, 6-7).   As Joaquà ­n Almunia,  Vice President  of the European Commission, commented at the time: ‘we have red lines,  we cannot  put an excessive  burden  on  the next generation’ (Commission 2008a, 6). Similarly, the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council continued to support the long-term application of the SGP: ‘we remain fully committed to sound and sustainable public finances. The Stability and Growth Pact provides adequate flexibility to deal with these exceptional situations’ (Council 2009). Thus, while European leaders led by Nicolas  Sarkozy, along with the broader international community, embraced more Keynesian orientated fiscal stimulus in order to counter the expected downward trend in demand presented by the intensification of the global financial crisis, the long-term European commitment to the neoliberal rules-based SGP framework remained relatively stable during this early crisis period.   In the Spring of 2010 Greek public debt was downgraded by the main credit rating agencies to junk status and a growing spread in yields emerged in Eurozone sovereign bonds (Checherita et al. 2010). Recalling these events later, President Van Rompuy noted that this sudden loss of confidence in the Eurozone provoked by Greece was a ‘real shock’ for which ‘we were not prepared’ (Council 2014). As one official in DG ECFIN remarked: ‘It was now internal: a crisis of the Eurozone’ (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). As the crisis intensified within the eurozone it was reframed by European leaders as a problem of fiscal profligacy amongst the periphery member states. On 11 February 2010, in a short emergency statement issued by Heads of State, they remarked that ‘all euro members must conduct sound national policies in accordance with the agreed rules’ (Council 2010). The discussion was also centred on Greece, with the Greek government being told ‘to implement all these measures in a rigorous and determined manner to effectively reduce the budgetary deficit by 4% in 2010’ (Council 2010). From a reading of the coordinative discourse, it was now Germany that was seen to be providing ideational leadership for framing the crisis in behavioural terms on Greek fiscal profligacy. As the largest eurozone country of course Germany’s voice was perhaps louder than the rest. I think it is fair to say that there was a perception in Germany that the troubles in the sovereign debt market had been caused by excessive government spending by certain periphery member states. (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). The Commission also concurred with these views. In fact, the EU executive took the unprecedented step of issuing a series of strict recommendations to ensure that the budget deficit of Greece was brought below 3% of GDP by 2012 (Commission 2010a). Joaquà ­n Almunia,  Vice President  of the European Commission, commented that ‘this is the first time we have established such an intense and quasi-permanent system of monitoring’ (Commission 2010a). In response to the escalating crisis in the eurozone, President Van Rompuy argued the case in March 2010 for the pre-eminence of a European Council led Task Force in driving reform negotiations on EMU governance. The framing of policy solutions within the framework of the Task Force setting was guided more by a neoliberal ideology towards the imposition of strengthened intergovernmental fiscal discipline. In the first statement issued by the Task Force on the 25 March 2010, the shift in policy responses by European leaders was already firmly established: ‘the current situation demonstrates the need to strengthen and complement the existing framework to ensure fiscal sustainability in the euro zone’ (European Council 2010b). Moreover, the final conclusions of the March 2010 European Council summit further instructed the Task Force ‘to identify the measures needed  to  reach  the  objective  of an improved crisis resolution framework and  better budgetary disciplineexploring all options to reinforce the existing legal framework’ (European Council 2010a). Again, in the coordinative discourse, officials drew attention to the renewed ideational leadership played by Germany in framing policy solutions for the crisis: You have to understand that for Germany in particular the idea of having enforceable rules and sanctions to maintain budgetary discipline is central to their vision of how EMU should operate. And during the crisis it was Germany that pressed the hardest for heighted budgetary surveillance (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President, 2014). A separate official commented on what they perceived as the inevitably of Germany’s leading role in setting the reform priorities within the task force: ‘But of course Germany takes a leading role here in view of its economic size. So Germany automatically was seen to take on a leading role, whether it wanted it or not ‘(Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). In contrast, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy led continued pleas for more fiscal solidarity: ‘The euro is our currency. It implies solidarity. There can be no doubt on the expression of this solidarity’ (BBC 2010). However, while it has been observed that ‘France under the stewardship of Sarkozy also had a role to play here’, it has been noted that he, in effect, was ‘forced to concede too many of Germany’s demands during the crisis deliberations’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). Thus, while Nicolas Sarkozy played an important role in leading a more Keynesian international response at the onset of the global financial crisis, as the crisis intensified within the eurozone the French President was forced to abandon solutions involving fiscal solidarity in favour of Germany’s more limited fiscal discipline objectives.    These framing priorities were reflected in the Final Report of the Task Force released to the public in October 2010. The main pillar of the suggested reforms was geared towards ‘greater fiscal discipline through a stronger stability and growth pact’ (European Council 2010, 3-4).   As part of its ongoing institutional dialogue with the Task Force, the ECB also offered its public support for legislative measures supporting a more rigorous  Ã¢â‚¬Ëœquasi-automatic’ implementation of the SGP rules (ECB 2010). Three key objectives were embedded in the Final Report of the Task Force: ‘the need for a greater focus on debt and fiscal sustainability’, ‘to reinforce compliance’ and ‘to ensure that national fiscal frameworks reflect the EUs fiscal rules’ (European Council 2010, 1-12). In remarks following the final meeting of the Task Force, President Van Rompuy documented that the ‘task forces commitment to a stronger Pact was high from the beginning to the end’ (European Council 2010c). Converging with the framing   activities of the Task Force, in September 2010 the Commission proposed the so-called ‘six-pack’ of legislative proposals centred on the concept of ‘prudent fiscal policy-making’ (Commission 2010, 1). These ‘fast-tracked’ proposals sought to strengthen the impact and effectiveness of the preventative arm of the SGP by giving it ‘teeth’ (EU Commission 2010, 4-5). These early framing activities led by deliberations within the Task Force also helped set the subsequent policy agenda in the form of a legislative ‘two-pack’ (proposed in November 2011) and intergovernmental ‘fiscal compact’ (agreed 8-9 December 2011). Building on the legislative six-pack, both measures were limited to strengthening intergovernmental fiscal discipline under the SGP, through strengthened budgetary surveillance and reinforced compliance (see Commission 2012). Crisis Normalisation Phase From the summer of 2012 to the winter of 2013 there was a gradual reduction in the eurozone periphery bond yield spreads. Key here was the ECB fulfilling its function as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2013; 2016). With the ECB able to temporarily normalise market reactions within the eurozone, it offered the prospect that European leaders may seek to reframe the crisis as demanding more supranational solutions. This assumption appeared to be confirmed when President Herman Van Rompuy, following a European Council summit at the end of June 2012, first mentioned the prospect of laying down a ‘longer-term vision’ for strengthening EMU (European Council 2012c). Following prior negotiations in the European Council, President Van Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission, the ECB, and the Eurogroup, presented in December 2012 a report entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. However, despite the possibility of a critical juncture event, the framing of policy solutions within the report continued to prioritise the strengthening of intergovernmental fiscal discipline over the short-term. The near term priority is to complete and implement the new steps for stronger economic governanceThe other elements related to strengthening fiscal governance in the euro area (‘Two-Pack’), which are still in the legislative process, should be finalised urgently and be implemented thoroughly (European Council 2012, 8). These reform priorities were also reflected in the coordinative discourse: ‘The priority has remained the implementation of the measures contained in the ‘‘six-pack’’ and ‘‘two-pack’’ proposals’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). And again, Germany’s ideational leadership in framing policy solutions was observed to be pivotal here: ‘There is an understanding amongst member states that budget discipline has to be ensured before more financial support can be offered. This is also a German insistence’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official, 2013). Moreover, while the ECB internally called for a ‘quantum leap’ in integration within EMU, this was strictly interpreted in terms of ‘further strengthening the budgetary discipline of the euro area Member States’ (ECB 2012:8). When discussing the reform solutions for implementation over the long-term (five years and more), there was a shift in the discourse of the Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union report towards the language of supranationalism. However, these framing devices were only reflective of a limited reform ambition. For example, the report mentions the possibility of gradually developing a ‘fiscal capacity’, which could help ‘cushion the impact of country-specific shocks’ and ‘prevent contagion across the euro area’ (European Council 2012, 9). Yet the precise form that any fiscal capacity should take within the euro area was left vague, with the report acknowledging that ‘the exact conditions and thresholds for the activation of transfers would need to be studied carefully’ (European Council 2012, 11). Moreover, it was also emphasised that the development of a fiscal capacity within the eurozone should ‘not lead to  permanent transfers  between countries’ and that this process should occur ‘without resorting to the mutualisation of sovereign debt’ (European Council 2012, 10-12). Tellingly, within the subsequent Conclusions of the December 2012 European Council, any mention of a fiscal capacity or shock absorption function for EMU was omitted, along with plans for debt-mutualisation (European Council   2012a). In the coordinative discourse, officials were able to account for the limited ambition shown in framing supranational solutions to the eurozone crisis by pointing towards a mixture of sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard amongst member states. For example, one official highlighted the constraining influence of these national interest ideas on integration within EMU: A degree of debt mutualisation or financial risk sharing could, in theory, help lower borrowing costs amongst the periphery member states and help ward off pressure from the financial markets but it effectively means the transfer of sovereignty, at least to some extent. That is the biggest obstacle: that is what it is all about. In the end it comes down to sovereignty and money (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). Similar ideas were raised by one official who, when asked to comment on the probability of securing supranational fiscal integration, answered candidly: ‘I think it is not very probable because of state sovereignty concerns’ (Advisor to the Cabinet of the European Council President 2014). The official argued that this is because a ‘fiscal union with tax powers going to the European Union level would be completely turning upside down the way the Union is currently running’ (Advisor to the Cabinet of the European Council President 2014). A separate official also drew attention to the importance of ‘concerns of moral hazard’, predominantly amongst the ‘core member states who want to be able to influence the periphery member states’ debt situation’ (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President 2014). There were also discussions in the Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union report concerning the development of a flanking ‘political union’ aspect, although again the supranational framing of the discourse was lacking in ambition.   In order to underpin the ‘democratic legitimacy and accountability’ of decision making the report called for the ‘the involvement of the European Parliament as regards accountability for decisions taken at the European level’, while at the same time ‘maintaining the pivotal role of national parliaments, as appropriate’ (European Council 2012, 16-17). The promise to maintain a ‘pivotal’ role for national parliaments, even in the event of a vertical transfer of powers to the European level, would appear to stem from an observation made in the report that ‘decisions on national budgets are at the heart of Member States parliamentary democracies’ (European Council 2012, 16). The report, then, explicitly divorced itself from supranational political solutions. In the coordinative discourse, sovereignty concerns were again raised as major hurdle to political integration: ‘People have different interests and different concepts of what a political union would be and as to what sovereign powers should be transferred’—adding that ‘we are not even discussing this’ (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). In November 2012 the Commission published its own Communication outlining A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a European Debate. Converging with the Van Rompuy report, the immediate framing of policy solutions was restricted to fiscal discipline objectives: ‘immediate priority should be given to the full deployment of the new economic governance tools brought by the ‘‘six-pack’’ as well as rapid adoption of current Commission proposals such as the ‘‘two-pack’’ (Commission 2012, 12). Once again, like the Van Rompuy report, the blueprint did cautiously embed more supranational frames when addressing the long-term reform agenda for EMU (five years and more). This is in keeping with the EU Commission’s pledge that ‘steps towards more responsibility and economic discipline should be combined with more solidarity and financial support’ (EU Commission 2012, 11). Accordingly, the framing of solutions shifted to demand more in the way of fiscal solidarity, with tentative ideas for a ‘fiscal capacity’ (or ‘federal budget’) and even ‘debt mutualisation’ schemes being   aired as possibilities ‘to support member states in the absorption of economic shocks’ (Commission 2012, 25-26). However, these solidarity mechanisms were envisioned as being implemented strictly after the new arrangements for fiscal discipline have been fully implemented. Also, the procedural details and legal basis for the solidarity mechanisms was left vague, with proposal covering options from ‘contractual arrangements’ to an ‘insurance’ type system. As one official commented: ‘I think there needs to be some ingredients of fiscal union. It’s not entirely clear which ones and to what extent; there are different views and these are tricky questions’ (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN 2013). Moreover, the blueprint also shied away from committing itself to any process of supranational political integration, with the EU Commission arguing that the ‘the Lisbon Treaty has perfected the EUs unique model of supranational democracy’ (Commission 2012, 35).   In June 2015, the President of the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidents of the Council, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, presented the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ entitled Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. It is notable that in the updated report the framing of policy solutions for fiscal integration was even less ambitious than it had been in earlier institutional reports drafted during earlier periods of the crisis. Apart from repeating the need to improve compliance with the new rules contained in the ‘six-pack’, ‘two-pack’ and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, there were no institutional innovations suggested for implementation over the short-term. Instead, intergovernmental fiscal discipline was again framed as the priority solution—with repeated references made to ‘responsible budgetary policies’ (Commission 2015, 14). The report also warned that ‘every Member State must stick to the rules, or the credibility of this framework is at risk’ (Commission 2015, 14-15).   In terms of the framing of solutions over the longer-term (five years or more), previous references to a ‘fiscal capacity’ and limited forms of debt mutualisation were completely omitted. Instead, the Five Presidents tentatively floated the idea of a ‘euro area-wide fiscal stabilisation function’ (Commission 2015, 14-15). Postponed strictly for ‘in the longer term’, the development of such a   function is envisioned as the culmination of a process of ‘convergence’ and ‘further pooling’ of decision-making on national budgets (Commission 2015, 14-155).   The report also cautioned that ‘it should not lead to permanent transfers between countries’ and that efforts should be made to ‘guarantee it is consistent with the existing EU fiscal framework’ (Commission 2015, 15). Tellingly the report was also explicit that ‘the exact design of such euro area stabilisers requires more in-depth work’ (Commission 2015, 14). As part of the Commission Presidents’ 2015 ‘State of the Union’ address, he argued for ‘a more effective and democratic system of economic and fiscal surveillance’ (Commission 2015a). However, there was again a noticeable lack of progress on political union. While the report affirmed ‘a key role for the European Parliament and national Parliaments’, practical steps to ensure the democratic legitimacy of decision making were limited to proposals to consolidate the external representation of the euro and the integration intergovernmental solutions (i.e. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance) within the EU legal framework (Commission 2015, 17-18). Framing in Context The dominant framing activities uncovered need to be understood in the context of the wider EMU policy environment. One of the key foundations of EMU was the ideational consensus reached in Europe on neoliberal economic principles in the 1980’s (McNamara 1998). However, while there developed a relative consensus that monetary policy would function in accordance with neoliberal principles, very little thought was given during the deliberations at Maastricht on the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) as to the possibility of accompanying these integration steps with progress towards a supranational fiscal union. As Verdun commented:   ‘Fiscal policy harmonisation was just simply one step too far; there was no support for a transfer of sovereignty over these matters to the European level’ (Verdun 1998, 122). From an early stage, therefore, political necessity dictated that fiscal policy would remain firmly in the intergovernmental realm. Yet from the perspective of underpinning EMU with an institutional framework that is in keeping with neoliberal ideas of ‘sound money’ and ‘sound finance’ (Dyson 2002), European economic and monetary integration was not completed at Maastricht. It was against this backdrop that the then German Minister for finance, Theo Waigel, advanced a proposal for a rules-based ‘Stability Pact for Europe’ in 1996. In summary, owning to the political constraints preventing fiscal supranationalism, coupled with the importation of neoliberal ideas, intergovernmental fiscal discipline became institutionalised at heart of EMU early on. Since its formation, the course of EU fiscal governance reform has been characterised by a strong ‘path-dependency’ (Pierson 1996). In fact, in view of the path-dependent constraints of the political environment, on top of the prevailing neoliberal ideational consensus, the rules-based framework for EU fiscal governance was never seriously challenged by European leaders throughout the first ten years of the single currency area (see Heipertz and Verdun 2011. While the onset of the eurozone crisis had the potential to represent a ‘critical juncture’ in the path for EMU integration (Bulmer 1994), the revival of concerns amongst member states over sovereignty and moral hazard have continued to render the intergovernmental structure of EMU a political necessity. However, although the minimal structure of EMU remains a manifestation of different conceptions of national interest, the prevailing neoliberal ideology has simultaneously continued to condition perceptions as to the efficacy of the SGP rules-based framework for fiscal discipline. Thus, while French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in tandem with the international community, was seen to be influential in leading a brief resurgence of more Keynesian oriented demand stimulus during the early stages of the crisis, European leaders defended the continued application of the SGP as the overarching framework for EU fiscal governance. The dramatic shift in early 2010 from ‘Anglo-Saxon’ external excesses to the internal vulnerabilities within the eurozone only exaggerated the path-dependent effect of competing national interests amongst member states while reinforcing the reversion to neoliberal solutions.   First, policy makers were responding with a degree of shock and panic to a crisis of potentially ‘existential proportions’ (as termed by a Member of the Cabinet for the European Council President, 2014). Operating in this environment of crisis, diagnosing the crisis in behavioural terms as resulting from fiscal profligacy and offering intergovernmental reform solutions limited to strengthening the SGP would have been both intellectually and politically attractive. Not only were these policy frames fully in line with the neoliberal logic of ‘sound  money  and finance’ enshrined since Maastricht (Dyson 2002), but they could also be implemented via secondary legislation under the current legal basis provided by the SGP framework. Moreover, buttressed by its economic weight and its considerable structural power within the EMU set-up, Germany was also increasingly in a strong position to provide ideational leadership in framing neoliberal solutions to the crisis. This can be contrasted with France who, as the crisis progressed, was forced to abandon more Keynesian solutions in favour of Germany’s more limited fiscal discipline objectives. Conclusion The intensification of the crisis within the eurozone brought with it a marked intensification of intergovernmental policy coordination within EMU. As the crisis progressed, the response by European leaders was to adopt problem and solution frames supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. Importantly, these frames were intellectually attractive as they were fully consistent with the neoliberal foundations underpinning EMU governance. Also, these frames were politically simple to express as they could be implemented in full under the pre-existing SGP legal framework. While there was a partial shift in the discourse towards supranationalism following the normalisation of the crisis, these discourses were always reflective of a limited reform ambition. In this context, a supranational framing of the crisis was found to be limited by constraining ideas of national interest concerning state sovereignty and issues moral hazard. Germany was also able to draw on its economic weight and bargaining power to provide ideational leadership, further directing the reform agenda towards intergovernmental fiscal discipline. In relation to the wider literature, these findings are broadly consistent with ‘new intergovernmentalist’ claims that supranationalism is unlikely to be obtained in the post Maastricht integration phase. This study though has helped develop a deeper political understanding of the current integration impasse in EU fiscal governance, and of the ideational and institutional path-dependencies working to limit the scope for far reaching reform. This analysis has also contributed to existing critical analysis on European integration by emphasising the central importance of neoliberal ideology in guiding framing preferences. Finally, one major consequence of these findings is that the imbalance between monetary and fiscal integration within the EMU framework will likely remain. However, further investigation will be needed to assess the long-term sustainability of running a single currency area with a decentralised system of fiscal policy. 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Machiavelli: Personal and Political Implications Essay -- Michiavelli

Machiavelli: Personal and Political Implications "And since it is Fortune that does everything, it is she who wishes us to leave her alone, to be quiet and not give her trouble, and wait until she allows us to act again; then you will do well to strive harder, to observe things more closely...." (67)* Letter to Francesco Vettori in Rome December 10, 1513. Machiavelli is praised for the political implications of his writing in The Prince. However, many do not see the personal implications of Machiavelli's work, because the motivations for action are spoken in terms of political domination and the acquisition of power. There are underlying principles that speak of domination not only of cities and nations, but the domination of the opportunities placed before each individual. The Prince can be read in a different manner; as a manual for daily life and the maximization of opportunity. The mere notion that Machiavelli, a former servant to a Republican government who praises the role of principality, exemplifies his belief that adversity can be a blessing that has not been considered or planned. In The Prince, Machiavelli devotes special attention to the lives of Cesare Borgia and Pope Julius II; men who turned even the most trying circumstances into an opportunity to advance. With careful analysis of The Prince, from the perspective of pe rsonal actions, certain fundamental principles for living are revealed by Machiavelli. The most prominent theme which Machiavelli introduces, and it is the basis upon which he praises Pope Julius II and Cesare Borgia, is to create opportunity where none seems apparent. The first step to achieving the greatness of Borgia and Pope Julius II is to utilize foresight. Princes, according to Mac... ... the political and into the world of the common man, whose virtuous lives make the path of the prince a much smoother one. Moreover, men who appear common can reach the inner sanctum of glory by utilizing the rare instinctive natures given to them. This idea is supported by the author's own self-perception as a commoner who transforms himself nightly by putting on "curtail robes" and entering his study (10). While Machiavelli restricts himself to the praise of princes through his writing, he opens the door to making each person's life meaningful through a healthy perspective of trials and the encouragement to be brave against anything that Fortune may bring. For not all men can prepare to conquer the world, but no one need be deprived of the ability to conquer opportunity. Works Cited: Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1947

Control Theory in Today’s Society

While many theories have been established through the years, the Control Theory established and researched by Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi in 1990 has inspired a large amount of research and proposed the most likely reason that people commit crimes. In addition to their initial theory, Harold Grasmick also presented another facet, the Self- Control Theory, claiming that people commit crimes simply because they lack the capacity to use self- control. These theories are both considered psychological theories, involving the way the human mind works in relevance to crime and the choice to commit crime. It is apparent in several past criminal cases that lack of self- control has been the leading factor in the criminal act. (Hay & Forrest, 2009) Gottfredson and Hirschi asked the question, â€Å"What is Crime? † and thus began to research the theories associated with crime and what drives people to commit criminal acts. Nearly all crimes, they concluded, are mundane, simple, trivial, easy acts aimed at satisfying desires of the moment. (Schmalleger, 2009) For example, a young child steals a candy bar from the local convenience store, simply because he wants the candy bar; this is not a violent or large- scale criminal act, but is still a violation of the law. The general theory of crime asserts that the operation of a single mechanism low self- control, accounts for â€Å"all crime, at all times†; including acts ranging from vandalism to homicide, from rape to white- collar crime. A person’s likelihood to engage in criminal activity or not can supposedly be explained through low self-control, the same way high self-control explains an individual's tendencies of conforming to social norms and laws. (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) Thus, some people have a lasting tendency to ignore the long term consequences of their behavior. These people tend to be impulsive, reckless, and self- centered. Crime is the end result of their tendencies. (Schmalleger, 2009) The Control Theory is considered a theory and not a perspective since it is not Gottfredson and Hirschi’s opinion, it is a theory that they proposed towards the rationality of crime and why people commit crimes. Several researchers, including K. A. Snedker and J. R. Herting have sought out to see the impact of youth and learning, their affect on self- control on children, as young as seven years of age. Different levels of social control and the culture the children are raised in often seem to have an effect on their personal level of self- control. In the study performed, the majority of the children that were exposed to behavior with â€Å"good† children often ended up having higher levels of self- control, and appeared less likely to behave in criminal behavior. However, the children that were associated with delinquent peers for large amounts of time were seen to have lower levels of self- control, and were also more likely to take part in deviant behavior with said peers. (Snedker & Herting, 2004) It can also be asserted that serial killers generally have a lack of self- control. In the case of Aileen Wuornos, who is labeled as the first know female serial killer in the Western world. The original theory of Gottredson and Hirschi can be used to explain why Aileen had the specific experiences she did, and committed such a large number of crimes. She even went so far as to state that, â€Å"murder was merely her solution to the problem as it presented itself on those seven occasions. † This clearly indicates one of the facets of the self- control theory, that criminals will do whatever necessary in the present situation, for self- gratification or other reasons. While Wuornos claims that she killed seven men in self- defense because they were raping her, she was subsequently convicted of murder and sent to death row. (Adams, 2009) The facts of Aileen Wuornos’ childhood have not be confirmed, but she admitted to smoking, drinking, irresponsible sex (she earned money as a prostitute), all at a fairly young age. These behaviors follow Gottredson and Hirschi’s exact assertions that those involved in criminal activity often start exhibiting short- term gratification at a young age. In the original control theory, Gottfredson and Hirschi low self- control sets as an internal condition between the ages of eight and ten years. According to Cindy Adams, a crime examiner on an internet â€Å"blog†, Wuornos’ deviant behavior began at the tender age of nine, so it can be assumed she lacked the proper socialization with her family members and caretakers. She never learned to show affection or share as most children do. Because of this, her relationships as a child failed her completely, and led her down a path of crime, prostitution, and eventually murder. It can be assumed that if Wuornos experienced a better childhood, she would have developed a higher level of self- control. According to the self- control theory, disciplined and supervised children generally will not look for self- gratification and commit criminal acts. (Adams, 2009) The story of Aileen Wuornos is a clear- cut example of why Gottfredson and Hirschi’s control theory is valid. Had she received the proper love and affection at a young age, she would not have offered sexual favors at the age of nine, become a prostitute at the fourteen, and looked for the abusive and destructive relationships she did throughout her life. The story of Wournos is only one confirmation of the Control Theory, and there are certainly many more if the cases and correlating information were to be researched. Travis Hirschi also went into greater detail concerning the Self- Control Theory, implicating that Individuals possess three (3) sets of traits: (1) traits composing low self-control; (2) traits predicting involvement in crime; and (3) other traits that are the result of socialization. Low Self- Control (LSC) traits appear in the first six or eight years of life, and include only â€Å"factors affecting calculation of the consequences of one's acts†. The second set of traits includes low intelligence, high activity level, physical strength, and adventuresomeness. The third set of traits includes impulsivity, insensitivity, and inability to delay gratification. These traits can be seen in criminals, for example, drug users. Consider the logical structure of drug use. Here, even drugs that do not affect mood (tobacco) are correlated with crime because they share features that satisfy both criminality and the requirements of crime. Both crime and drug use provide short-term, immediate, and easy pleasure, and more importantly. In this view, drug use is not attributable to peer pressure, but to the fact that it is prohibited and has an adverse impact on health. LSC personalities must logically come prior to criminality because they are predisposed to disregard legal prohibitions and negative consequences for their own health. Drug users are people who â€Å"tend toward criminality†, and may self-destruct in any number of ways. Another way of saying this is that LSC is the domain and criminality only covers a portion of this domain. LSC allows almost any deviant act that is â€Å"logically† possible. (Hirschi, 1969) References Adams, C. 2009-07-27 â€Å"Crime 101: What is the link between self- control theory, serial killing, and Aileen Wuornos? † Retrieved from http://www. examiner. com Gottfredson, M. and Hirschi, T. (1990). A General Theory of Crime. Stanford University Press. Hay, C. and Forrest, W. â€Å"The Development of Self Control: Examining Self Control Theory's Stability Thesis† Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC) . 010-04-03 from http://www. allacademic. com/meta/p121508_index. html Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: Univ. of Ca Press. Longshore, D. , Turner, S. , and Stein, J. (1998). â€Å"Reliability and Validity of Self-Control Measure: Rejoinder. † Criminology 34:175-182. Sampson R. J. and Laub, J. (1993). Crime in the Making Pathways and Turning Points Through Life. Harvard University Press. Schmallege r, F. (2009). Criminology Today: An Integrative Introduction Fifth Edition. Prentice Hall. Snedker, K. A. and Herting, J. R. , 2004-08-14 â€Å"Revisiting Hirschi’s Social Control Theory: Examining Changes in Self- reported Delinquent Behavior among Youth† Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association 2010- 04-17 from http://www. allacademic. com/meta/p110751_index. html Wenk, D. , Hardesty, C. , Morgan, C. and Sampson, L. B. (1994). â€Å"The Influence of Parental Involvement on the Well-Being of Sons and Daughters. † Journal of Marriage and the Family 56:229-234.